In the following paper I attempt to show how in Locke''s liberalthought the individual is subject to a complex operation involvingliberation and subjugation. In A Letter on Toleration (1685),Locke argues that the individual''s inward beliefs should be freed fromthe coercion of Church and State. To ensure liberty of conscience, theindividual''s soul should be constituted in practice – notstructured by violence but negotiated by rational persuasion. However,as I suggest, the authority of reason is not established without anelement of violence. In his (...) writings on education, Locke maintains thatthe right to care for one''s soul should be enjoyed only after rigorousmoral training. Thus, the individual''s conscience is to be freed fromoutward violence of ecclesiastic and civil powers only after first, inyouth, being subject to the moral discipline of esteem, disgrace, andshame, the inward violence of which discloses limits in Locke''sdiscourse on toleration. (shrink)

In this paper I attempt to question central assumptions of Derrida's strategy of deconstruction by analyzing his critique of Hegel's notion of Aufhebung. Hegel's dialectics claims to sublate conflicting difference between not individuals in reconciled communal relations. Deconstruction exposes, however, how Hegel's dialectics leads not to reconciliation but the violent internment of différance; traces of repression reveal the limits of Hegelian reason. Yet by grasping Hegelian dialectics as a restricting economy involving repression, Derrida has difficulties accounting for the difference Hegel (...) introduces between repressive and productive power. In his early philosophy of ethical life (1801-1803), Hegel differentiates between moral and legal coercion (Zwang) and ethical subjugation (Bezwingen). In Glas, as I seek to show, Derrida reduces the difference between these two economies of power without proper justification. Derrida's deconstructive interpretation of Hegelian dialectics thus takes part in the repressive relève it criticizes by limiting a difference in Hegel's discourse on power. (shrink)

In this paper, I will attempt to show how in its reinforcement of relations of subordination, Hegel's conception of the Ethical reveals structural parallels with Antonio Gramsci's notion of hegemony. First, I will analyze Gramsci's notion of hegemony. In his notebooks written in prison between 1929 and 1935, Gramsci employs the term 'hegemony' to focus attention on the determinate role of socio-cultural formations in sustaining relations of domination. In his eyes, a group maintains its supremacy not simply through the direct (...) domination of the coercive state apparatus but also through the organized consent of the governed in civil society. The dominant group thus needs to resort to legal constraint only as a last line of defense, when in times of a crisis of authority the effective self-identification of the governed with the hegemonic formations breaks down. Second, I will attempt to highlight how in Hegel's Philosophy of Right , ethical mediating institutions in civil society, including education, public authorities, and corporations, function in a way similar to Gramsci's notion of hegemony by creating what Hegel himself terms 'a fundamental sense of order' rooted in the 'habit of the Ethical' that promises to organize the more 'spontaneous', 'unhesitating' consent of the collective. Through the formation of this fundamental ethical sense of order, Hegel believes that coercive law may be rendered increasingly 'superfluous'; that is, precisely the role Gramsci sees 'ethical-political hegemony' play in the transition from the 'nightwatchman' to the 'ethical' state. Yet in contrast to Hegel's normative claims, I will try to show how at the level of civil society these ethical mediating institutions in fact fall short of their intended goal. Rather than 'reconcile' individual interest with public utility, they serve to strengthen asymmetrical distributions of power that inhibit the resolution of social conflicts in a mutually beneficial manner. Hegel's conception of the Ethical therefore functions here in a way similar to hegemony to the extent that it molds a sense of order that solidifies relations of subordination. (shrink)

In this paper, I will attempt to show how in its reinforcement of relations of subordination, Hegel's conception of the Ethical reveals structural parallels with Antonio Gramsci's notion of hegemony. First, I will analyze Gramsci's notion of hegemony. In his notebooks written in prison between 1929 and 1935, Gramsci employs the term 'hegemony' to focus attention on the determinate role of socio-cultural formations in sustaining relations of domination. In his eyes, a group maintains its supremacy not simply through the direct (...) domination of the coercive state apparatus but also through the organized consent of the governed in civil society. The dominant group thus needs to resort to legal constraint only as a last line of defense, when in times of a crisis of authority the effective self-identification of the governed with the hegemonic formations breaks down. Second, I will attempt to highlight how in Hegel's Philosophy of Right, ethical mediating institutions in civil society, including education, public authorities, and corporations, function in a way similar to Gramsci's notion of hegemony by creating what Hegel himself terms 'a fundamental sense of order' rooted in the 'habit of the Ethical' that promises to organize the more 'spontaneous', 'unhesitating' consent of the collective. Through the formation of this fundamental ethical sense of order, Hegel believes that coercive law may be rendered increasingly 'superfluous'; that is, precisely the role Gramsci sees 'ethical-political hegemony' play in the transition from the 'nightwatchman' to the 'ethical' state. Yet in contrast to Hegel's normative claims, I will try to show how at the level of civil society these ethical mediating institutions in fact fall short of their intended goal. Rather than 'reconcile' individual interest with public utility, they serve to strengthen asymmetrical distributions of power that inhibit the resolution of social conflicts in a mutually beneficial manner. Hegel's conception of the Ethical therefore functions here in a way similar to hegemony to the extent that it molds a sense of order that solidifies relations of subordination. (shrink)

In this work David Durst explores the development of modernism in the philosophy, politics, and culture of the first German Republic between 1918 and 1933. Through a reasoned critique of various Weimar intellectual figures such as Ernst Bloch, Martin Heidegger, and Theodor Adorno, Durst offers clarity and insight into the various aesthetic postures of the interwar period. From the cultural vibrancy of the early Weimar period to the eventual decay towards fascism and Nazi rule,Weimar Modernism provides a new and coherent (...) way to examine this important era, which has often been presented in a fragmented manner. (shrink)

Since the fall of communism in 1989 Southeast Europe has been a site of far-reaching societal transformation, much of it marked by political crisis, economic upheaval, ethnic tension, and bitter war. The book comprises articles investigating the history and development of civil society in post-communist Southeast Europe. How is civil society to be grasped, what are the historical factors shaping the civil societies of the region?, what is the function of civil society in the transition to democracy and a market-economy?, (...) and what are the prospects for the future development of the civil societies of the region in an age of globalization?, –these are just a few of the major questions addressed in this collection of articles. Many of the authors are social scientists, philosophers, and activists from the region, offering first-hand critical analysis of the state of civil society in Southeast Europe and suggesting theoretical and practical strategies for the future course of its development. The aim is to provide the reader with insight into the complex challenges that face the civil societies of the region. (shrink)